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ABSTRACT
The concept of a dual labour market is analysed in a two-sector general
equilibrium model. The primary sector pays efficiency wages, while there
is no connection between efficiency and the relative wage level in the
secondary sector. The two sectors produce different goods. Capital is
assumed sector-specific. The log-linear version of the model is solved
analytically under the condition of wage flexibility and for different
forms of wage rigidity with respect to sector 2. The results may be used
to explain observed differences in wage and employment distributions in
the US and Europe.z
1. Introduction
Labour markets in the US and Europe are different in structure.
Whereas the US experienced an "employment miracle" in the eighties Europe
was stuck with high unemployment rates. A possible explanation of high
unemployment in a number of European countries is the relatively narrow
wage distribution in these countries. This view is consistent with the
observation that unemployment is heavily concentrated among low productiv-
ity groups.
Empirical evidence on characteristics of the wage structure is
presented in Frijns and Van Schaaijk (1987). The authors show that the
quantile ratio (Q90~Q10) of the monthly pay distribution of full-time
workers in manufacturing shows a substantial difference between Europe and
the US. The average ratio of male workers for seven European countries
amounts to 2.1 compared with a ratio of 3.6 for the U.S. Other statistics
given by Frijns and Van Schaaijk point in the same direction. With regard
to the relation between employment in the low-wage brackets and the wage
dispersion a distinction should be made between the change in wages and
the level of relative wages. A rise in European unemployment between 1977
and 1983 of workers at the lower end of the pay structure cannot be assoc-
iated with a substantial rise of the relative wage level of this category.
However, there appears to be a relationship between the change in the
unemployment rate and the relative wage level. A comparison of develop-
ments in the US and the Netherlands shows a strong growth of unemployment
(especially at the lower wage brackets) in the country with the narrow
wage distribution, in casu the Netherlands. The twin observation is that
the "employment miracle" in the US may have a shadow side in the form of a
more unequal pay distribution.
The dual labour market theory which has its origin in sociology
(e.g. Ashton, Chapter 3, 1986) may shed some light on these issues. The
idea of a dual labour market has more recently gained solid ground in
economics by the introduction of a two-sector model with a union sector
and a non-union sector. A brief survey of this approach is presented in
Greenhalgh, et.al. (1983), Oswald (1985) and Sinclair (1987). As observed
by Akerlof and Yellen (1986) dual labor markets can also be explained by
the assumption that the wage-efficiency nexus is important in some sectors3
but not in others. Here we shall follow this suggestion by constructing a
Harris-Todaro two-sector model (see Harris and Todaro, 1970). Efficiency
wages are paid in the primary sector of the economy and neo-classical
market-clearing of the labour market prevails in the secondary sector. In
earlier fornulations of the dual labour market theory the primary sector
is supposed to have some control over the product market. As argued by
Ashton (1986) recent research shows that the link between imperfect compe-
tition in product markets and efficiency wages is not as deterministic as
suggested by older theories. It may therefore be legitimste to assume that
product markets are competitive as we do here. The employment and unem-
ployment consequences of rigid wages will be investigated by assuming a
minimum wage law. If the minimum wage level is binding it may imply nomi-
nal wage rigidity or when minimum wages are indexed real wage rigidity.
Moreover, we consider the possibility that real wage rigidity is accompa-
nied by some pressure on the wage distribution. In the spirit of general
equilibrium theory we assume that the sectors produce different commodi-
ties and analyse the consequences of a shift in consumers' preferences,
along with other shocks to the system. Capital is considered to be sector-
specific and growth factors are treated as exogenous shift parameters.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 the
micro foundations of the model are given proper attention. Efficiency wage
theory in the primary sector is based on a variant lntroduced by Hahn
(1987). To obtain neat analytical solutions, which can be easily interpre-
ted, the log-linear version of the model is presented in Section 3. The
results obtained are discussed in Section 4 with emphasis put on the ~ac-
tors that may influence duality. The paper closes with some conclusions.
2. A two-sector model with segmented labour markets
It will be assumed that the economy comprises two sectors wíth a
qualitatively different output. In both sectors labour is combined with a
fixed and sector-specific capital stock to produce commodities. Efficiency
wages are paid in the primary sector, while in the secondary sector there
is no link between remuneration and efficiency. The link between wages and
labour efficiency in sector 1 is based on the adverse selection model
explored among others in Weiss (1980). Here we follow a somewhat novel4
approach of that model introduced by Hahn (198~). Firms in sector 1 pay
relatively high wages to attract workers with high ability signals for
every skill group. Ability signals are things like education, experience,
references etc. By assumption higher ability always implies higher produc-
tivity. To complete the picture we add the hypothesis that ability is
negatively related to search cost. Therefore, the firm knows that the
higher the wage paid relative to the wage level in the other sector the
greater will be the proportion of workers with high ability signals apply-
ing, at least up to a certain point.
Denoting output by x, employment by ~, efficiency by e and capital
by k the production function of sector 1 reads:
(2.1) xl - fl(e.~l;kl) , fi ) 0 , fï ( 0
, where f' and f" stand for respectively the first and second derivative
of the production function with respect to labour expressed in efficiency
units. As argued, efficiency is positively related to the wage differen-
tial. Denoting the nominal wage rate in sector 1 by wl and in sector 2 by
w2 the efficiency function can be written as
w
(2.2) e- e(W1) , e(0) ~ 0 , e' ) 0 , e" ~ 0
2
The efficiency function has the usual characteristics, which guarantee an
interior solution in case of profit maximization (cf. Akerlof, 1982): (1)
no positive effort is obtained at a zero wage; (2) the elasticity of e
with respect to wl~w is declining for an increasing wage ratio.
2
With the price of output (pl) and the nominal wage rate in sector
2(w2) given the representative firm in sector 1 faces the following pro-
blem:
Max rt - plfl(e,il
;kl) - wl~l
{il,wl}
subject to equation (2).
The first-order conditions for this problem are5
(2.3) Plfi - él
(2.4) plfi - é2
Combination of equations (3) and (4) yields the familiar "Solow condition"
, w
(2.4a)
e 1 - 1
e w2
For an optimum the elasticity of the efficiency function should be equal
to unity (Solow, 1979). With wZ given the nominal wage rate in sector 1
can be found from this equation. Substitution of the optimal value of wl
in equation (2.2) gives the optimal level of efficiency. The outcome for e
can be substituted in equation (2.3) to obtain the level of employment .C1.
In the secondary sector efficiency wages play no role; the wage-
productivity relationship is weak or non-existant. Consequently, the de-
mand for labour in sector 2 depends upon the wage, which is determined in
the spot market for secondary jobs. The production function for sector 2
is
(2.5) x2 - f2(~2;k2) ~ f2 ~ 0 , f2 ~ 0
Maximization of profits in the short run requires that marginal revenu




The aggregate supply of labour (.Cs) is exogeneously determined. Worker who
cannot find a job in the primary sector apply for work in the secondary
sector. The wage rate in sector 2 can be found by equating labour supply
and labour demand in this sector:
(2.~) ,Cs - ~1 - ~26
For a given value p2 equations (2.~) and (2.8) simultaneously determine
the wage rate and employment in the secondary sector.
The mobility of labour between sectors may not be so perfect as
assumed here. After all, there may be a substantial wage differential and
there is rationing of jobs in the primary sector. Therefore, as observed
among others by Hall (19~5), Akerlof and Yellen (1986) and in another
context also by McDonald and Solow (1985), workers who do not get a job in
sector 1 could prefer searching above accepting work in the secondary
sector. The search process can be modelled if a number of additional as-
sumptions is made. But the question remains whether search is compatible
with an equilibrium. To illustrate this point consider the following case
which greatly simplifies the search model in McDonald and Solow (1985).
There is a fixed percentage of jobs (ó~l) in the primary sector which will
open up in (continuous) time, because people die, retire, quit, etc. All
vacancies are filled from a transitional pool (~Cp) consisting of workers
in search for a job in sector 1. The probability of finding a job, if
numbers are large enough so that frequencies and probabilities can be
S~1 identified, is then ~-~. Under static expectations lifetime income of
P
persons in the pool equals: (~ wlt(1-~)v)~r, where v is unemployment com-
pensation and r is a discount rate. If workers are risk-neutral this op-
tion should be equal to lifetime iiicome from working in the secondary
sector (w2~r):
~ wl t (1-~)v w2
r r
Substituting the formula for the probability of finding a primary job
gives after some manipulation:
wl-v
~p - b~l wZ-v
The volume of the pool is positively related to the number of primary
jobs, the turnover rate of these jobs, the wage differential and unemploy-
ment compensation. However, one may doubt whether this theory gives a
complete picture. First, people not only die but also get born. A part ofthe jobs coming available in the primary sector may go to new entrants in
the labour market. Second, there is the chance of a direct transmission of
workers from sector 2 to sector 1 despite a lower search intensity of the
employed. Third, workers may be risk-averse and the risk of not finding a
primary sector job may increase when staying longer in the pool.
For these reasons we shall ignore search and stick to the labour supply
equation (2.~) in our subsequent analysis.
The model must be closed by introducing demand. All income is
flowing to consumers. The representative household maximizes utility,
which depends on quantities consumed of both goods, subject to the usual
budget constraint. To make the analysis tractable it is assumed that the
utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas type. The share of income spent on
each commodity is therefore constant. Denoting quantities consumed by the
same symbol as quantities produced, that is postulating equilibrium in
both markets, we may write,
(2.8)
Plxl - a Y
, where y is total income:
(2.9) Y - Plxl } p2x2
Finally, the nominal level of prices is determined by a simple quantity
equation:
(2.10) y - v M
, where M indicates a given quantity of money.
The complete model comprises the equations (2.1) -(2.10), which
can be solved for the endogenous variables, viz., xl, xZ, .il, ~2, e, wl,
w2, pl, p2 and y. The solution is illustrated in a diagram which is well-
known from the theory of international trade (e.g. Dixit and Norman, 1980,
chapter 2). In Figure 1 the nominal wage rate in sector 1 is measured










The curve AA' measures the demand for labour in sector 1 given the equili-
. .
brium values e and pl. The nominal wage rate in sector 2 is measured
along the vertical axis to the right. The demand for labour (.~2) at the
r
equilibrium price p2 is given by the curve BB' which runs from the right
to the left. The distance between the vertical axes is equal to the total
supply of labour ,~s. The curves are linear for illustrative reasons only.
Firms in sector 1 choose point S on the demand curve for labour AA' given
the wage rate in sector 2. The wage rate in sector 2 is determined by
supply and demand given the amount of labour employed in sector 1. The
solution is shown in point S' on the curve BB'. It should be observed that
a solution always lies to the left of the point of intersection (S") of
the curves AA' and BB'.
If the government sets a minimum wage above the level that results
from the free play of market forces as may be typical for a number of
European countries there will be unemployment. The same result applies in
case unemployment benefits lead to a reservation wage of workers which is
higher than the equilibrium wage rate in the secondary sector. The solu-
tion in these cases is presented in Figure 2. The minimum wage level is
indicated by w2. Given this wage rate in the secondary sector firms in the











sector 2 is elastic at the point w- w. Employment in the secondary 2 -2
sector is determined at the intersection of the elastic supply curve and
the labour demand curve of that sector (point S'). The resulting unemploy-
ment is marked by u in Figure 2. If the discrepancy between primary and
secondary sectors ís substantial there may be a large number of low-paid
workers in the equilibrium. That is the price that has to be paid for
maintaining full-employment with a relative large secondary sector. Such a
solution seems more typical for the US than for Europe where relative
poverty may be transformed into unemployment by a generous social security
system and minimum wage legislation.
The figures illustrating solutions in case of a dual labour market
are merely instructive. To understand the model more fully an algebraic
solution must be given. For this purpose a log-linear version of the model
will be discussed next. Such a linear version is well-suited for simple
comparative statics when variables are cast in the form of rates of
change.10
3. The linear version of the model
The model may be linearized by deriving logarithmic approximations
of the functional forms at an initial solution. Differentiation of the
log-version which respect to time gives a linear model in rates of change,
which are indicated by a dot over the variable (for instance x- dx 1)
dt x
The linear equivalent of the production function (2.1) can be
written as
(3.1) X1 - P1(et,~l) t (1-pl)kl
, where gl denotes the share of labour in value-added of the primary sec-
tor at the initial solution. Linearization oF the effort function (2.2)
needs more explanation. An example of a function with the required propor-
ties is given in Akerlof (1982):
w l~




The function is shown in Figure 3. Differentiation with respect to time
and assuming that b and ~r are constant results in
de 1 a~ da 1 t yb




w" (dt wl - dt w2)
2
, where initial solutions are marked with an asteriks. To simplify the
above expression parameters may be given the following values: y-~,
r
a- e. The linear version of the effort function reads in this case:
(3.2) e - (wl-w2) - a
The second term on the RHS of equation (3.2) relates to vertical shifts of
the effort function. An upward shift (a C 0) means that firms in sector 1
can afford to pay lower relative wages to get the same efficiency level as
before. This may be interpreted as a qualitative improvement of the labour
force, so that firms in the primary sector can hire workers with the right
ability signs more easily. The linearization procedure can be applied in a
similar way to a more general effort function with the required characte-
ristics such as the one illustrated in Figure 3.
As shown for instance in Van de Klundert (1983), Bruno and Sachs
(1985) the linear version of the equation of the demand for labour in
efficiency units (2.3) can be expressed in the following way:
(3-3) e } ~1




, where ol denotes the elasticity of factor substitution in the primary
sector. The other first-order condition taken into consideration for
linearization is the Solow condition (2.4a). Differentiation of this
equation with respect to time gives:
M
, d wl,w2 wl d wl,w2 de
e dt } " er' dt - dt
w212
Dividing through by e and substituting (2.4a) results in:
w
wl e,~
(wl-w2) t : e~ (wl-w2) - e
w2
, which can be rewritten as
(3.4) w - w - e
1 2 1-y '
.
W1 e" with y; - „ e, , 0( y~ C 1
w2
The elasticity of marginal effort (y) must be smaller than one, because
the elasticity of the effort function must be declining (e.g. Akerlof,
1982). In the case of the specification of this function given above we
gety- 1 -y.
The linear version of the production function and the demand for
labour in sector 2 are obtained easily. From equation (2.5) we have:
(3.5) x2 - p2 ~2 t (1-p2) k2
, where g2 denotes the share of labour in value-added of sector 2. Equa-
tion (2.6) yields the linear labour demand relation in the secondary sec-
tor:
62 . . .
(3.6) ~2 - - 1-p2 (w2-p2) } k2
, where o2 denotes the elasticity of factor substitution in sector 2.
Labour-market equilibrium ímplies according to equation (2.~):
(3.7) 8.~1 t (1-9)~2 - ~s
, where 8 is the share of labour in the primary sector at the point of
linearization.
On the demand side of the model account will be taken of a shift
in demand from goods produced in sector 2 towards goods produced in sector
1. As a consequence the linear version of equation (2.8) may be written as13
(3.8) pl {xl -Yta
Applying the linearization procedure to equation (2.9) results in
(3.9) Y - ~(pltxi) t (1-a)(p2tx2)
, where a denotes the share of expenditure with respect to sector 1 at the
point of linearization. Finally, the linear version of the quantity equa-
tion (2.10) reads
(3.10) y - M
The complete linear model comprising ten equations with the same
number of endogenous variables can easily be solved. The solutions will be
discussed in the next section.
4. Wages differentials, sectoral employment and unemployment
The nominal wage ratio is set by profit maximizing firms in the
primary sector. Combining equations (3.2) and (3.4) one gets:
a
(4.1) wi - w2 - w
(4.2) e - ~ a
An increase in the shift variable worsens the labour market situation for
firms in the primary sector, so that a higher relative wage rate must be
paid to obtain the same efficiency level as before the change. The equili-
brium efficiency level increases because y~ 1 holds.
From equations (3.1)~ (3.3), ( 3.8) and (3.10) the following ex-
pression for employment in the primary sector can be derived
(4'3a) ~1 - 1-51(1-01)
C-61(wl-M-a) t (1-A1)(1-61)(kl-e)~14
A similar result can be found for employment in sector 2 by using equa-
tions (3.5), (3.b). (3.8). (3.9) and (3.10).
(4.4a)
~2 - 1-52(1-62)
~-a2(w2-M t 1~~ a) t(1-p2)(1-62)k2~
As appears from the semi-reduced forms (4.3a) and (4.4a) things can be
simplified considerably by assuming that production functions are of the
Cobb Douglas type, that is assuming al - 62 - 1. Elasticities of substitu-
tion close to one are found in a number of empirical studies, which makes
this approximation acceptable. The solutions for employment in both sec-
tors are then easily obtained bearing equations (3.~), (4.1), (4.3a) and
(4.4a) in mind.
(4.3) ,ll - ,ls - ly~g a t 1-~ a
(4. 4) ,C2 -,Cs t w a- la~ a
Equations (4.3) and (4.4) give rise to a number of interesting observa-
tions. An improvement in the effort function (a ~ 0) raises employment in
the primary sector and lowers employment in the secondary sector. Such an
improvement may be the result of a better education of the labour force,
which makes it easier for firms in the primary sector to attract workers
will high ability signals. An increase in the labour force (~s ) 0) leads
to a proportional rise in employment in both sectors, which is understan-
dable because the nominal wage ratio does not change. However, if a muta-
tion in the supply of labour is accompanied by a change in the qualitative
composition of the labour force this result does not hold. For instance,
an inflow of relatively less educated workers will make it more difficult
for firms in sector 1 to maintain their share in total employment. There-
fore, it must be concluded that the effort function will deteriorate (a )
0), leading to a shift in employment from the primary to the secondary
sector. As a result the bulk of the increase in labour supply must be
absorbed in the secondary sector.15
A similar reasoning applies in the case of a shift in demand. A
shift towards the primary sector (a ) 0) raises employment in that sector
at the expense of employment in sector 2, as follows from equations (4.3)
and (4.4). Such a reallocation of labour may not be possible without af-
fecting the effort function. To attract additional workers with the same
efficiency level as the employed workers firms in the primary sector may
have to increase the wage differential. Such a change in opportunities may
eventually prevent a reallocation of labour on impact of a change in de-
mand for commodities. The upshot of this discussion is that the effort
function may not be invariant to changes in the parameters or exogenous
variables of the model. As a specification of the effort function which
takes such complications properly into account is difficult comparative
statics conclusions should be formulated with the required cautiousness.
Returning to equations (4.3) and (4.4) it should be observed that a change
in the capital stock of a sector does not affect employment in that sec-
tor. Under the Cobb-Douglas assumption the positive direct effect on em-
ployment of an increase in capital is counterbalanced by the negative
indirect effect of an increase in the real producers' wage.
To study the effect of different shocks on the purchasing power of
wages in different sectors we first define the consumers' price index in
the usual way as:
(4.5) Pc - ~ pl t (1-~)pZ
The real consumers' wage for both sectors can then be expressed in follo-
wing manner:
(4.6) wl - pc - wl - pl t(1-~) (P1-P2)
(4.~) w2 - pc - w2 - p2 - a(pl-p2)
The real producers' wage in both sectors can be found by substituting
equation (4.3) in equation (3.3) and by substituting equation (4.4) in
equation (3.6) taking the assumption 61 - 6z - 1 into account.16
1-8
. (1-9) f ~1(8-w) .
(4.8) wl - P1 -(1-~1) L(kl'~S) -~Z a] t w a
(~.9) w2 - P2 -(1-~2) [(k2-~S) - g a t lg~ a]
rhe relative pi~ice of commodities can be derived after some manipulations
as:
(4.10) P - P - (~ -~ )~ t 1-
(~28 - ~1(9-W)) .
1 2 2 1 s ( ~2)k2 -(1-~1)kl t w a 4
1-~1(1-8)-~29 .
1-a a
The following simplifying assumptions which relate to the solution of the
model at the point of linearization are made: ~- S -~, 8-~. 1 2
In addition we postulate kl - k2 - k. Although these assumptions may seem
rather restrictive, they enable to focus on the main determinants of sec-
toral real wages in terms of the composite consumption good. The real
consumers' wage for both groups of workers can then be deduced from equa-
tions (4.6) - (4.10).
(4.11) w - P - (1-~) (k-~ ) t [1-a t (1-a)~] a t (1-~)(8-~) a 1 c s ~ 1-~
(4.12) w - P - (1-~)(k-~ ) - [(1-~) t ~~] a t (1-~)(9-~) a 2 c s 1-~
A change in the relative factor abundance has a proportionate effect on
the purchasing power of workers provided that the initial share of labour
is the same in both sectors. If labour becomes more abundant the real
consumers' wage of workers in the primary and in the secondary sector
falls by the same percentage. A shift in demand for commodities has under
these assumptions a uniform effect on the real consumers' wage of both
groups of employers. A higher preference for goods of the primary sector
increases the purchasing power of workers if 9)~, that is if there is a
labour-intensity bias with respect to the primary sector. A deterioration
of the wage-effort relationship in sector 1(a ) 0) induces a higer real17
consumers' wage in the secondary sector. A worsening of employment condi-
tions in the primary sector could be the result of a divergent development
between the qualitative input requirements at the one hand and the availa-
bility of workers with the right abilities on the other hand. In such a
pessimistic growth scenario duality would become more pronounced. More
workers would have to be employed in the secondary sector at a lower real
wage rate, at least compared with employees in the primary sector.
An unequal distribution of labour income may lead to government
intervention in the form of minimum wage legislation. This could imply no-
minal (downward) wage rigidity (NWR) on real (downward) wage rigidity
(RWR). The case of NWR is rather simple. For w2 - 0 the solution of wl
follows immediately from equation (4.1). Substitution of these results in
equations (4.3`) and (4.4a) ignoring now shifts in consumer demand yields
when the production functions are Cobb-Douglas:
(4.13) ~1 - M - w a
(4.14) ~2 - M
Under the condition that in the initial situation the supply of labour
exceeds the demand for labour relative changes in (un)employment (~d) are
given by:
(4.15) ~d - 9 ~1 4 (1-9)~2 - M - g a
An adverse development affecting the wage-effort relationship in the pri-
mary sector now leads to an increase in unemployment. Firms in the secon-
dary sector will not absorb the excess labour of the primary sector at the
going wage rate in sector 2. However, because nominal wages in sector two
are rigid the monetary authorities could inflate the economy out of the
unemployment equilibrium.
Things are more complicated when minimum wages are adjusted to the
cost of living index implying:
(4.16) w2 - Pc - ~ pl t (1-~)p218
Substitution of equations (3.1), (3.3), (3-5). (3.6), (3.9), (4.1) and
(4.2) in equation (4.16) results in a solution for w2 under RWR. To get
easily interpretable though still useful conclusions we again introduce a
number of simplifying assumptions, i.e. al - cs2 - 1, S1 - p2 -~, kl - k2
- k and a- 0. The solution for the nominal wage rate in sector 2 then
reads:
(4.1~) w2 - M f 1~ a- k
The outcome for the nominal wage rate in the primary sector follows from
equations (4.1) and (4.1~)
(4.18) w1-Mt (l~t~) a-k
Employment in both sectors can be found by combining equations (4.1~) -
(4.18) and equations (4.3a) -(4.4a) bearing the simplifying assumptions
made earlier in mind. The results can be used to define the percentage
change in (un)employment as:
(4.19) ~d - 8 ~1 . ( 1-8)~2 - - [ 1~4 S ~ a t k
A deterioration of the wage-efficiency conditions in the primary sector is
translated into higher unemployment. Under RWR the effect is greater than
under NWR as appears when comparing equations (4.15) and (4.19). A loss in
efficiency in sector 1 induces a rise in the price of good 1. The wage
rate of workers in sector 2 will rise to stabilize their purchasing power.
The ultimate result will be a higher level of unemployment as more workers
in the secondary sector lose their job. Money is neutral under RWR, but
capital accumulation has a positive effect on employment. With NWR and
Cobb-Douglas production functions an increase in the stock of capital has
no influence on employment, because production rises through capital dee-
pening. If relative prices and real wages are fixed as in the case of RWR
production increases on account of capital widening.19
It should be observed that RWR as such does not imply a change in
the wage structure. Equation (4.1) still holds. However, it could be the
case that RWR does go hand in hand with a levelling of the wage distribu-
tion. If this occurs the Solow condition (3.4) should be replaced by
(4.20) wl - w2 - q
, where q is an exogenous shift variable affecting the wage structure.
Under these circumstances firms are not longer in a position to maximize
profits as they have to accept an autonomous reduction in labour efficien-
cy:
(4.21) e - -~ q , ,y C 1
The change in employment in both sectors can now be calculated along the
lines set out earlier for the case of RWR. (T'he simplifying assumptions
made above hold and additionally we assume y- 1).
2
(4.22) ~1 - ( 1 - 1 ~) q
(4.23) ~ , - - ~ ~ - 1-~ q
, which gives:
(4.24) ~d - (g - ~)q
Employment in the primary sector may rise or fall depending on the values
of the parameters p and a. For a- ~ employment in sector 1 is constant
and aggregate employment changes by :.Ld --(1-8)q. Labour demand in the
secondary sector declines on any account. These results can easily be
explained. In the primary sector the loss in efficiency is to a certain
extent counterbalanced by the fall in real producers' wages. The outcome
may go either way. Moreover, the decline in efficiency leads to a rise in
pl and therefore to a reduction in purchasing power for which workers in20
sector 2 get compensation. Real consumers' wages in sector 2 remain con-
stant, but real producers' wages increase as can be seen from equation
(4.~). It may be concluded that a more narrow distribution of wages is
accompanied by a higher level of unemployment of relatively low-producti-
vity workers.
5. Conclusions
The growing concern about poverty in the midst of plenty in indus-
trialized countries may be an indication of a more pronounced duality in
the economy with important consequences for the labour market. If primary
sector jobs get lost because a more sophisticated production process re-
quires relatively more workers with high ability the secondary sector must
absorb more labour. This will lead to a more unequal real wage distribu-
tion between workers in both sectors. A growth in the labour force will
have a similar effect if it upsets the productivity distribution as may be
the case with immigration from developing countries.
Whereas such developments may prevail in the US, the situation in
Europe is different. Minimum wage legislation and generous unemployment
compensation in a number of European countries may set a floor to the wage
rate in the secondary sector. An intensification of duality will then show
up in increased unemployment of low-productivity groups. The problem is
most severe with real wage rigidity in the secondary sector. In the latter
case monetary policy is of no help and unemployment must be fought by
supply-side measures.
Future research on the dual labour market may focus on the speci-
fication of the efficiency-wage relationship in different sectors of the
economy. In addition, a distinction could be made between groups of wor-
kers with different skills, which are imperfect substitutes in the produc-
tion process. As in the present paper general equilibrium theory can be
applied to integrate these different strands of analysis.21
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